rights laws that prohibit discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 5 age, 6 or disability. 7 Most state courts also preclude terminations that would contravene a significant public policy, such as the right to serve on a jury or to refuse falsify a government-required report. Labor Board -that they enjoy the support of a majority of employees in specified nits.
on demands, the workers may elect to strike, but a struck employer possesses the lawful it has no formal rights under U.S. labor law.
A non-majority union may not become the exclusive bargaining agent for a group of workers, but it may bargain for specified employees on a members-only basis -if any employer agrees to such a voluntary arrangement. 12 It is rare for employers to have any dealings with unions that have not established -either through authorization cards signed by a majority of employees in particular units or through secret ballot elections conducted by the u If an exclusive bargaining agent is selected by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit, that entity has the right to negotiate with their employer with respect to their wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. These negotiations may occur at the enterprise level, the plant level, or the shop level, depending upon the structure of the employing firm and the issues to be addressed. The employer is required to bargaining in good faith over such issues, but it is not obliged to make any concessions or to agree to any particular union demands. 13 If the employer refuses to give in to uni 12 Although Professor Charles Morris has cogently argued that even non-majority unions have the statutory right to demand bargaining on a members-only basis that would permit them to negotiate on behalf of actual union members without employer consent, it is doubtful the Labor Board or the U. American labor organizations had successfully represented millions of workers for whom they enhanced their wages, fringe benefits, and general employment conditions. They created a true middle class for many blue collar employees. Although unionized companies tended to have greater productivity than nonunion firms, the wage premium generated by the bargaining process diminished the overall profits earned by organized corporations. The accommodation that had existed between labor and management during the 1950s and 1960s began to deteriorate due in part to the elevated inflation during the latter part of the 1970s which caused wages to rise substantially for unionized workers covered by cost-of-living-adjustment clauses which rose with increases in the consumer price index. Labor-management relations also declined in the latter part of the 1970s, after the business community worked successfully to defeat relatively modest labor law reform proposals that had been sought by union supporters.
By 1980, the percentage of private sector workers who were union members had declined to twenty-three percent. That decline was further exacerbated by globalization and the transfer of millions of production jobs to lower cost countries like Mexico and China, and the shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing economy to a white-collar, professional, and service economy -sections which unions found difficult to organize.
By the end of 2010, only 6.9 percent of private sector employees were union members.
19
This means that the vast majority of employees no longer have a collective voice vis-avis their corporate employers. The ninety-two percent of private sector workers who do not have union representation have no legal right to participate in the operational management of their employers. They are employed on an at-will basis, and are subject to termination at any time for almost any reason. If an informal group of employees were to get together to discuss specific employment issues with their employer, they would be engaged in "concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection" within the meaning of Section 7 of the NLRA 35 and be protected against retaliatory actions. On the other hand, if individual employees were to try to influence firm decisions affecting employment conditions, they
would not be engaged in protected concerted conduct -unless they were acting on be of other employees or were seeking to induce other workers to support their actions.
Although most nonunion U.S. employers wish to remain unorganized, many have begun to appreciate the gains that may be achieved through limited worker participation programs. They have thus formed committees consisting of rank-and-file employees management personnel that are designed to focus on issues such as productivity and service quality. Most of these employers participate directly in the selection of the employees to serv to be addressed.
Although these firm-generated worker participation programs have become In a series of decisions, the Labor Board has technically limited the ability of nonunion employers to establish and maintain worker participation committees. 38 The
Board must initially determine whether the entity created by the employer constitutes a "labor organization" within the meaning of Section 2(5). A "labor organization" will be found if the participation committee in question consists in whole or in part of employees who act in a representational capacity by purporting to speak on behalf of other workers, and if it "deals with" the employer with respect to wages, hours, or working conditions. the employer merely solicits input from such a committee and then decides on its own what to do, the committee would not be "dealing with" management. 39 On the othe hand, if managers and employee committee members discuss various proposals and t employee members influence final firm decisions, the committee would be "dealing It is ironic in the U.S. that nonunion workers are provided with no statutor to participate in firm operations at the plant level -and that employer efforts to c meaningful worker participation programs are likely to be unlawf members act in a representative capacity and "deal with" their employer in any significant manner with respect to wages or working conditions. Some employers try to avoid layoffs that might be generated by greater productivity, and they even discuss gain-sharing with the employee committees to rewa workers for their increased outputs. Nonetheless, other firms do not hesitate to lay o redundant personnel and retain a shareholders. 42 It is experiences like those emanating from these latter companies that make employees skeptical about the benefits they are likely to derive from worker participation committee efforts.
III. FEATURES OF EMPLOYER-ESTABLISHED WORKER COMMITTEES
Most of these committees consist of rank-and-file employees and management personnel. In some cases, the employer selects the individuals to serve, while in others the workers are allowed to select their own representatives. The law could require that two-thirds or three-quarters of committee members be elected by rank-and-file employees, with the other one-third or one-quarter being elected by lower level management personnel who often think that their voices are not being heard by higher management officials. Committee members could serve four year term with half being elected every two years to provide some continuity. Term limit im d to insure that the same individuals would not serve for prolonged period enterprise level participation committees were established, the members of such firmwide committees could be elected by local worker participation committees.
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Although employers have generally opposed legislation that would grant employees the right to participate directly in managerial decisions, two factors m ultimately persuade them that such programs would not necessarily have negative consequences. First, if unions use the Internet to reach employees whose employers h established internal worker participation programs designed merely to improve productivity and quality, with minimal benefit to the affected employees, more u 45 Rank-and-file employees and lower level managerial personnel could also be allowed to elect several corporate board members to allow them to express worker interests at board meetings, with all board members having dual fiduciary obligations to both workers and shareholders. Where shareholder and worker interests conflict, board members could be immune from liability so long as they make good faith decisions that reasonably consider shareholder and employee interests.
labor practice cases will be prosecuted before the Labor Board at substantial cost to firms. Second, if most businesses remain unorganized when eighty-seven percent of workers wish to have some collective voice, more employees may contemplate aw at ld be economically inefficient. The s and rams may be called "quality circles," "production ams," uality, unionization and many will seek greater legislative involvement at the federal and state levels designed to further restrict managerial freedom. In addition, more wrongful l suits will be filed which will cost employers millions of dollars.
Employer representatives regularly complain about the increasing legislative and judicial regulation of employment relationships. They assert that the inappropriate behavior of a few aberrant companies has generated restrictive federal and state rules that unreasonably limit the managerial freedom of mainstream firms. They also maintain th rational employers do not overtly discriminate or make personnel decisions based upon improper considerations, noting that such conduct wou cost of replacing skilled employees who possess firm-specific training is so high that corporate leaders would not unnecessarily sever beneficial employment relationship risk placing their firms at a competitive disadvantage.
American business officials maintain that human capital is their most important resource, and they claim they treat their workers fairly and generously. To enhance employer-employee relations, many companies have created shop level employee participation committees. These prog te or "quality of work life programs." These arrangements are designed to facilitate communication between managers and employees, to improve product or service q and to increase worker productivity.
When the legal status of many firm-established worker participation programs ha been challenged, the Labor Board has held that such instituti s ons constitute "labor d icipation programs to tivity and te employee insecurity.
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Employees reasonably fear that suggested productivity enhancements will be rewardednot by greater firm appreciation, but by layoffs caused by the need for fewer workers. Business leaders believe that companies need worker part increase worker-management communication and to enhance employee produc output quality. They recognize that firms in countries like Germany and Japan have used employee involvement committees to improve their competitive positions in global markets, and would like to achieve similar benefits in the U.S.
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Corporate executives frequently complain about the lack of employee commitment to firm objectives. They cannot understand why their workers do not share their institutional enthusiasm. They ignore the fact that they have specifically told new employees that their positions can be terminated at any time for any reason. They fail to appreciate the fact that these employment-at-will relationships and lack of worker involvement in the managerial decision-making process genera Corporate managers possess the capacity to protect themselves against business vicissitudes. They enjoy access to confidential information regarding firm performance and they exercise meaningful discretion over decisions that affect their own futures. Th can usually avoid the insecurity associated with employment-at-will arrangements through individual employment contracts that guarantee their continued employment for specified terms. They may be able to obtain generous severance packages if they lose their positions through corporate reorganizations or buyouts. They often benefit from bonus payments and stock options that are unavailable to most subordinate personnel.
Rank-and-file employees are generally treated no better than the equipment they use or operate. 50 Even though such employees commit thei of their respective firms, they enjoy no employment security. They are not privy to confidential firm information, nor are they usually consulted about business decisions that may directly affect their employment destinies. Most lack the unique personal skills 50 See CHARLES A. REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 22 (1995).
American employees are feeling increasingly isolated and underappreci
Most would like the opportunity to be part of larger employment communities in which they could openly share their ideas and concerns with their colleagues. 
V. SUMMARY
The U.S. has no formal rules requiring worker participation at the shop level.
Where employees have selected labor organizations as their bargaining agents, they able through such unions to influence their wages, hours, and working conditions both at the enterprise level and the shop level. Such bargaining relationships were quite common throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when twenty-five to thirty-five percent of private sector workers were union members. As a result of globalization, transition from an industrial to a white-collar and service economy, and increased employer opposition labor organizations, the percentage of private sector workers in unions has declined to percent. As this downward trend has occurred, federal an the void with the enactment of many statutes restricting managerial freedom. Judicia decisions have eroded the traditional employment-at-will rule allowing employers to terminate employees at any time for almost any reason. A number of employers have established their own employee committeesprimarily to enhance product or service quality and to improve productivity. Many of these institutions constitute "labor organizations" within the meaning of the NLRA are actually unlawful if the employers control the selection of employee members or the issues to be addressed.
If the ninety o
